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ABSTRACT
Fatal accidents are a major issue hindering the wide accep-
tance of safety-critical systems using machine-learning and
deep-learning models, such as automated-driving vehicles.
Quality assurance frameworks are required for suchmachine-
learning systems, but there are no widely accepted and es-
tablished quality-assurance concepts and techniques. At the
same time, open problems and the relevant technical fields
are not organized. To establish standard quality assurance
frameworks, it is necessary to visualize and organize these
open problems in an interdisciplinary way, so that the ex-
perts from many different technical fields may discuss these
problems in depth and develop solutions. In the present study,
we identify, classify, and explore the open problems in qual-
ity assurance of safety-critical machine-learning systems,
and their relevant corresponding industry and technological
trends, using automated-driving vehicles as an example. Our
results show that addressing these open problems requires
incorporating knowledge from several different technologi-
cal and industrial fields, including the automobile industry,
statistics, software engineering, and machine learning.
1 INTRODUCTION
The recent development in the machine learning techniques
such as deep neural networks has led to the widespread ap-
plication of systems that assign advanced environmental per-
ception and decision-making to computer logics learned from
big data, instead of manually built rule-based logics [4]. Avail-
able big data and affordable high performance computing
such as deep learning framework on off-the-shelf GPU [24]
made highly complex machine learning techniques practical.
Machine-learning models are becoming indispensable com-
ponents even in systems that require safety-critical environ-
mental perception and decision-making, such as automated-
driving systems [1]. For human society to accept safety-
critical machine-learning systems however, it is important
to develop common quality-assurance (QA) frameworks for
managing the risks of usingmachine-learningmodels [3]. QA
has an impact on the social receptivity, because it can be one
of the approaches to deliver safety and security. In fact, re-
cent accidents caused during the use of several experimental
automated vehicles have revealed QA frameworks as impera-
tive for addressing this upcoming social issue [2]. However,
although the automated-driving technologies are being ac-
tively developed and proposed on a daily basis, QA concept
and technologies to ensure safety and security have not
been systematized yet. Therefore, in this study, we organize
the review open QA problems on safety-critical machine-
learning systems using in-vehicle automated-driving sys-
tems equipped with machine-learning models as an example.
The contributions of this study are:
• Proposed points of view to clarify open QA problems
on safety-critical machine-learning systems;
• Proposed possible open QA problems on safety-critical
machine-learning systems along with the POV;
• Shown the recent trends addressing the open prob-
lems;
• Shown ideas to address some of the open problems;
• Shown the relevant industrial fields and the next re-
search directions to address the open problems.
2 QUALITY ASSURANCE OF IN-VEHICLE
AUTOMATED-DRIVING SYSTEMS
An automated-driving vehicle is a vehicle that operates with-
out human input. Automated driving is not built as a stand-
alone system in a vehicle. To realize automated driving,
a system consisting of clouds, roadside devices (fog), and
automated-driving vehicles (edge) [6] are necessary that
creates and updates high-precision digital maps [5], and co-
operates with peripheral vehicles. An in-vehicle automated-
driving system installed in a vehicle is composed of multiple
subsystems for perception, planning, and control, and it re-
alizes automated-driving operations in cooperation with the
clouds and roadside units. Each perception, planning, and
control subsystem may contain machine-learning models,
as necessary. Supervised-learning models [7] and decision-
reinforcement learning models [8] can be used for perception
and planning, and conventional control theory can be used
for control, respectively. On the other hand, in order to per-
form QA on a system, it is necessary to predefine quality
standards and a QA process in advance, and strictly follow
them at development time. In this study, we identify open
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problems related to the three levels: the in-vehicle automated-
driving system, the subsystems, and the machine learning
model. Thus, we use an automated-driving system as an ex-
ample of a safety-critical machine-learning system. Then, we
investigate the open QA problems in terms of the three steps
of the development process: design (requirements and speci-
fications), verification (including validation), and operation
(including maintenance). The three levels and three steps
are shown in Fig. 1. Open problems that can be addressed
using conventional methods are beyond the scope of this
research study and are therefore excluded. Notably, many of
the open problems considered in this paper do not occur only
in automated-driving systems, but in safety-critical systems
in general.
3 OPEN PROBLEMS OF IN-VEHICLE
AUTOMATED-DRIVING SYSTEMS
In-vehicle automated-driving systems are automated-driving
systems that are installed in vehicles. In the three layers of
the system operating on an automated vehicle: the in-vehicle
automated-driving system, the subsystems, and the machine
learning model, only the former is exposed to the physi-
cal environment. Therefore, it is necessary to consider data
on the physical environment more than theoretical assump-
tions when designing and verifying an in-vehicle automated-
driving system. The open problems in this paragraph are to
capture the operational physical environments of automated-
driving systems, and address the intractableness of field op-
eration testing (FOT).
Requirement: QA requires limitations, orwarranty scopes.
Therefore, a machine-learning system must be implemented
in a predefined environment. In the automobile industry, this
is called the operational design domain (ODD), and it essen-
tially corresponds to the driving conditions with which the
system is compatible [10]. Efficiently collecting driving sce-
narios on actual roads from past field operational tests and
customer data remains a huge task and an open challenge in
QA, but it is necessary for defining assumed environments
and verifying the developed QA system against them. In
addition, the evaluation criteria (such as test coverage) must
be defined for the collected scenarios, in order to measure
whether they are sufficient to ensure safety and security.
Verification: The simplest approach to guaranteeing the
quality of an in-vehicle automated driving system is through
verification against actual data. Accumulating a large num-
ber of safe automated-driving trips, as long distance as with
human drivers, will effectively demonstrate that automated-
driving systems are as safe as human drivers. However, ob-
taining statistically significant results would require conduct-
ing FOT by driving for hundreds of thousands to hundreds
of billions of miles FOT [11]. In order to verify the system
within a realistic time-frame, it is necessary to accelerate
the experiment by simulation, reproducing the corner-case
scenarios on test courses with a short mileage, i.e., scenarios
with extremely low probability of occurrence and difficult to
statistically obtain (rare) by FOT on the actual road.
3.1 Trend
The German PEGASUS project is a joint initiative of vehicle
manufacturers (OEM), suppliers, tool vendors, certification
organizations, and research institutes, which aims to define
standard QA methods for automated-driving systems [12].
The purpose of this project is to clarify the expected per-
formance level and evaluation criteria of automated-driving
systems through scenario-based verification. The scope of
the project includes standard test procedures, continuous
and flexible tool chains, integration of tests into the develop-
ment processes, cross-company test methods, requirements
definition methods, driving scenarios, a common database
of scenarios, as well as creating safety statements based on
them. Each scenario is defined by three levels of abstraction:
the functional scenario (natural language description), the
logical scenario (parameterized model), and the concrete sce-
nario (model with specified parameters). First, in the concept
phase, natural languages are used to describe the functional
scenario without ambiguous terms, in a way that can be un-
derstood by human experts. Next, in the system development
phase, we define the parameters and their distributions, and
describe the logical scenario in a specified data format. In
the test & verification phase, specific parameters are sam-
pled from the parameter distributions, and the scenario is
detailed into a concrete scenario, so that it can to be executed
(simulated) with test tools. Scenarios are collected from test
drives and the market to demonstrate that systems are equal
to or better than human drivers. Regular scenarios are con-
tinuously tested by simulation, and those critical are tested
through artificially configured environments on test courses.
The PEGASUS project is an excellent example of continuous
definition of requirements for (in-vehicle) automated-driving
systems and their verification. The open problems in QA for
the in-vehicle automated-driving system level require sta-
tistics and simulation techniques to develop solutions for
scenario collection and verification, respectively. Thereafter,
it is expected that the automobile industry (especially vehicle
manufacturers) will select the appropriate solutions and lead
the standardization process.
4 OPEN PROBLEMS OF SUBSYSTEMS
Subsystems run on top of the in-vehicle automated-driving
system to provide special functionalities. The open problems
in this paragraph are to design subsystems which include
machine learning models, by considering and applying the
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Figure 1: Development Process of Safety-Critical ML Systems (Example: In-Vehicle Automated-Driving Systems)
characteristics of machine learning, such as uncertainty and
"Change Anything Change Everything" (CACE) [15] .
Requirement: Subsystems with machine-learning mod-
els have uncertainty derived from the machine-learning mod-
els. Therefore, it is necessary to develop methods for describ-
ing this uncertainty as a statistical measure.
Design: Thus, QA must be conducted independently for
each subsystem including those incorporatingmachine-learning
models. As a result, QA of subsystems that do not usemachine-
learning models can be performed through conventional
methods, with minimal change in the development process.
Subsystems with different functionalities, such as percep-
tion and planning, may require different QA approaches. For
example, the same QA approach cannot be applied to per-
ception with a Convolutional Neural Network [7] and to
planning with a Deep Q-Network [8]. In general, a machine-
learningmodel cannot achieve 100% accuracy on test data [13],
and as accuracy approaches 100%, further performance im-
provement becomes difficult. Therefore, optimizing machine-
learning models are not the only way to improve subsystem
performance. In fact, a subsystem should be subdivided and
verified based on its development process, combining the con-
ventional deductive approach with the inductive approach
that is unique to machine learning [14]. Rigorous breakdown
of subsystem requirements into machine-learning model re-
quirements is essential for safety-critical machine-learning
systems. In this process, safety analysis methods and pro-
cesses are important, such as: black box verification; encapsu-
lation of machine-learning models by rule-based safeguard-
ing; redundant & diverse architecture that mitigates and
absorbs the uncertainty of machine learning models; system
modification patterns to cope with additional requirements
without modification of the machine-learning model, in or-
der to avoid the principle of CACE as much as possible.
Verification: Moreover, in order to prevent reworking
after training the machine-learning models, which is a heavy
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heuristic process, it is necessary to verify the validity of the
redundant architecture. Assuming that a machine learning
model behaves probabilistically based on the predetermined
uncertainty, we would like to know if the uncertainty of the
entire system is absorbed or mitigated, before training the
model.
4.1 Trend
System-level technologies STAMP/STPA [16] and GSN [17]
have received attention in recent years. They are highly
promising, but they will need an extension that can express
the uncertainty related to the machine-learning models. In
addition, SOTIF, which is a safety standard/process concern-
ing performance limits of normal functions, is also focused
on securing functions with uncertainty even under normal
conditions [18]. We consider that the most relevant technical
area for QA at the subsystems level is software engineering.
Subsystems are the intermediate layer between the deduc-
tive (manual) development of systems and the inductive
(data driven) development of machine-learning models. The
safety-critical properties of systems should be managed at
the subsystem level and handed to the machine-learning
models.
5 OPEN PROBLEMS OF MACHINE
LEARNING MODELS
A machine-learning model is acquired by executing a train-
ing algorithm (training) with a model structure and training
data sets as inputs. A machine-learning model before deter-
mining the parameters by training is called a model structure
in this paper. Trained machine models are evaluated using
test datasets [19]. The open problems in this paragraph are to
deductively design the requirements of the machine learning
models and their test data, as the final step manual engineer-
ing in machine-learning systems.
Requirement: In machine learning, we consider that the
roles of training data and test data are different. While the
training data is used for improving the performance of the
machine-learning model, the test data should be used to ac-
curately reflect the environmental conditions in operation.
For example, when all the data obtained at the time of de-
velopment are randomly divided, some of them are used as
training data and the others are test data. In this way, the
training data and the test data are approximately equally
distributed, but the relationship to the operational data is
unknown. Particularly in a safety-critical machine-learning
system, it is necessary to design the test data distribution
considering the operational environment, in which the sys-
tem will actually be operated in the future, and to collect test
data based on the designed data distribution. In this way, by
accepting an a-priori viewpoint of the test data distribution,
we can deductively define the assumed environment, and
inductively collect data based on the requirements of the
overlaid subsystem. Moreover, by assuming the distribution
of the test data, we can now discuss their distribution, and
define the operation domain with concrete design informa-
tion.
Even in the current development of in-vehicle automated-
driving systems, the test data would be collected assuming
the operational environment, in order to make the distri-
bution at the time of operation and the distribution of the
test data as consistent as possible. However, the methods of
describing the assumed environment of machine-learning
models are not organized. In particular, we need methods to
describe the properties of the test data. Furthermore, since
the required performance may change depending on the
assumed environment, it is necessary to express the associ-
ation between the assumed environment and the required
performance. Test data should have attributes such as time
and weather, and their distributions, which are based on
the assumed environment. Each condition of the test data
distribution should have a confusion matrix which machine
learning models will have them as desired value (Table 1).
In Table 1, the confusion matrix (accuracy) is shown as a
requirement of the machine-learning model, but there are
other quality characteristics of machine-learningmodels that
should be investigated. In order to use machine-learning
models in safety-critical systems, it is necessary to define
and evaluate models by the performance indicators from
various perspectives besides accuracy. If we refer to the soft-
ware quality model [20], then accuracy (confusion matrix),
resource behavior (required memory), time behavior (exe-
cution time), fault tolerance (robustness against Adversarial
Examples [22], hereinafter referred to as AE), analyzabil-
ity (ease of internal visualization or interpretability), and
testability (simple model structure advantageous for formal
verification) appear to be relevant perspective (performance
indicator) to machine-learning models.
Design: A machine-learning model is automatically ob-
tained by training the model structure using the training
data. Thus, specifications cannot be designed a priori. This
limitation is essential, because high-performance machine-
learning models are realized by learning high-dimensional
parameters from data that engineers cannotmanually specify.
However, in the development of a safety-critical machine-
learning system, at a minimum, it is necessary to record
the model structure, the training data, and the training sys-
tem (including hyper parameters, initial parameters, random
number seeds, etc.) to secure the reproducibility of the train-
ing process. In this way, specification is achieved indirectly.
Operational data tend to change with time, creating a ma-
jor problem for the operation and maintenance of machine-
learning models [21]. In this way, the deviation between test
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Table 1: top - sample environment (data distribution), bottom - sample requirements (confusion matrix)
time
day night
weather fine 40% † 30%rain 20% 10% ‡
fine × day † prediction
pedestrian vehicle
actual pedestrian 90% 10%vehicle 20% 80%
rain × night ‡ prediction
pedestrian vehicle
actual pedestrian 85% 15%vehicle 15% 85%
† e.g., when fine day there are many pedestrians, therefore precision on pedestrian is prioritized.
‡ e.g., when rainy night there are many vehicles, therefore precision on vehicle is prioritized.
data used during development and operation data becomes
large as time elapses from completion of development. It is
important to check the consistency between the operational
data and the test data (originally assumed environment), and
to make the machine-learning models follow the operational
data in a continuous maintenance process.
Verification: Some quality characteristics cannot be eval-
uated with test data. For example, when evaluating robust-
ness against AE as fault tolerance, it is necessary to artificially
generate perturbations around the original test data points.
We can generate AE near each individual test data point
and quantify robustness by maximizing the AE to which the
model can give correct answers. Besides robustness, there are
also demands for measurement methods of various quality
characteristics as listed above.
5.1 Trend
Increasing stability against disturbance, that is, enhancing
robustness is a key to QA. AE occurs when the image recog-
nition model incorrectly recognizes slight noise that cannot
be recognized by humans with high confidence [22]. AE is
known to have model-independent versatility and is an is-
sue that threatens the safety of automated-driving systems
depending on image-recognition technology. Study on AE is
important not only for defending intentional attacks such as
false traffic signs, but also for understanding the formation of
decision boundaries of machine learning model and realizing
highly robust recognition functions.
Inference processes of advanced machine learning models
such as neural networks (NN) are considered black boxes.
In particular, safety-critical systems should exhibit inter-
pretability and transparency. In this context, a black box
refers to a situation, where, although feature activations can
be observed physically, the actual phenomenon cannot be
understood. Regarding interpretability, NN visualization [23]
shows great promise. In NN visualization, one method in-
tentionally performs occlusion on input data, and specifies
the region where the inference result changes drastically
as a region of interest; another method back-propagates ac-
tivation values from the influencer nodes at the later fea-
ture extraction process to identify the region of interest. NN
visualization may have use in cases of debugging during
training, and validation of the training result (understand-
ing the internal behavior of the trained NN). Therefore, one
open problem is obtaining concrete use cases to address the
interpretability and transparency of safety-critical machine-
learning systems, by using NN visualization, interpretation,
transparency methods.
In the previous paragraphs, we presented the current
trends in machine-learning technology related to QA of
machine-learning models. Furthermore, even in the field
of theoretical computer science, toward a verification of
machine-learning model, automatic coverage verification
based on formal verification technology is becoming possi-
ble (Table 2). The technical areas necessary for QA at the
machine-learning model level are machine learning and the-
oretical computer science.
6 CONCLUSION
With the development of rapid technology in recent years,
machine learning has been used in various systems. In order
to use machine learning in a safety-critical system such as
an automated-driving system, it is necessary to demonstrate
the safety and security of the system to society through
QA. In this paper, taking automated driving as an exam-
ple, we presented the open problems and corresponding
research/industry trends from the viewpoint of design, ver-
ification, and operation for in-vehicle automated-driving
systems, subsystems, and machine-learning models. As a
result, we found that the automobile industry (standardiza-
tion), statistics, software engineering, machine learning, and
5
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Table 2: Trend on Automatic Coverage Verification for Machine-Learning Models
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theoretical computer science are the relevant industrial fields
and the next research directions to investigate for solving
the open problems of in-vehicle automated-driving systems,
subsystems, and machine-learning models, respectively.
In order to enable QA of safety-critical machine-learning
systems, research on elemental technology is also necessary,
but even if each company carries out its own QA based on
its own concepts, the results cannot be widely accepted by
human society. Experts from each specialized field as men-
tioned in this paper should gather together, create technically
reasonable drafts, proposing QA processes, and form con-
sensus (standardization) overviewing the worldwide trends
of safety-critical machine-learning systems. To this end, the
present study can form a basis for future discussion and in-
terdisciplinary research, with the aim to create a draft QA
process.
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